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Althusser famously explains the constitutive effects of ideology in terms 
of a process of “interpellation” by which an ISA (Ideological State 
Apparatus) addresses and calls upon the individuals who become its 
subjects. To be specific, Althusser asserts that individuals are constituted 
as subjects by misrecognizing themselves in response to this process of 
interpellation – a misrecognition that, rather than merely a matter of 
individuals fitting themselves to the terms in which they are called, 
involves a misinterpretation, even resistance to, the terms in which they 
are addressed: “Ideology ʻtransforms’ individuals into subjects by that 
very precise operation which I have called interpellation or hailing” 
(Althusser 163). Althusser emphasizes that ideological misrecognition is 
conducted not at the level of ideas – of how subjects come to think about 
themselves – but rather at the material level of what we may call their 
ideological practices, which are a matter of how subjects act and interact 
in response in response to being interpellated: “THESIS II: Ideology has a 
material existence” (155).  
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A much commented upon weakness of Althusser’s account is its 
failure to explain how exactly individuals come to “interiorize” the 
constitutive effects of interpellation (Žižek Sublime 43). Both Žižek and 
Pfaller attempt to overcome this weakness by invoking a psychic 
structure of disavowal, in which people “see though” the ideological 
beliefs that they enact in their ideological practices but even so 
irrationally – we may even say “perversely” – enact them. Žižek makes the 
important additional point that, paradoxically, this “leftover stain 
of…irrationality, far from hindering the full submission of the subject to the 
ideological command, is the very condition of it “(43). Or as Pfaller puts it, 
it is precisely the gap between what people know and the beliefs upon 
which they act that ensures their ideological subjection.1 To put it in a 
nutshell, it is people’s imbrication in a perverse structure of disavowal, 
specifically their enacting ideological practices despite “seeing through” 
them, which enables their subjection to ideology.   
 
 Despite their post-Althusserian similarities, Žižek and Pfaller differ 
at three key points. Firstly, Pfaller differs from Žižek by allowing the 
existence of what, in Gramscian terminology, we might call ideology in 
the “good” (or, what Gramsci calls “highest”) sense of the term – “happy” 
ideological practices through which subjects playfully act out the beliefs-
of-others, which they “know better” than to endorse. In Pfaller’s terms 
(also adopted by Žižek), such subjects are “interpassive” in so far as they 
delegate to naïve others the beliefs that, despite not sharing them, they 
enact. Pfaller distinguishes this “good” ideology – what he calls an 
ideology-of-belief – from a “bad” ideology-of-faith, through which people’s 
object-libidinal pleasures are displaced by narcissistic self-esteem.  
 
 In this article I suggest an account of ideology that draws upon but 
also reaches beyond both Pfaller’s and Žižek’s accounts. I begin with a 
little more detail of the differences between Althusser’s and Gramsci’s 
accounts of ideology, with a view to introducing what (by Althusserian 
lights) is Gramsci’s objectionable concessions to idealism – concessions 
that we find in both Žižek and Pfaller’s revisons of Althusser. I include this 
historical material out of a perhaps overly pessimisitic conviction that, 
even today the radical consequences of Althusser’s account of ideology 




are not widely enough, let alone fully enough, appreciated (Krips). Those 
who know their Althusser well may want to skip this section.     
 
 
Althusser and Gramsci 
 
As Althusser tells it, the early Marx of The German Ideology conceived 
ideology as mystificatory ideas that, to the benefit of the ruling class, 
“misrepresent”, and thus cover over, the exploitative nature of the 
economic practices in which the working classes are led to participate. 
Althusser sets himself against this (what he calls) “idealist” conception of 
ideology by reconceiving ideology in materialist terms, as a set of 
practices though which people support their own exploitation. It follows 
that ideology takes on an objective material existence, namely as 
people’s material ways of supporting of their own exploitation – a support 
that, Žižek points out, may be totally at odds with their subjective 
intellectual opposition to being exploited. In Žižekian terms we may say 
that people are not stupid in the sense that they are unaware of being 
exploited. Instead they are perverse in the sense of letting it continue 
despite being aware of it.2   
 
 Althusser’s reconceptualization of ideology leaves us with a key 
question: namely, which material practices to count as ideological, and 
how (if at all) they differ from the economic practices that Marx locates in 
what he calls “the base”?3 Althusser answers this question by taking 
ideological practices to be support for, and thus secondary to, economic 
practices (Althusser 128). Specifically, Althusser conceives ideology – for 
example, the socially normative activities of the bourgeois family – to be 
social practices that are necessary for the reproduction of the human 
labor power that is a necessary component of the economic processes 
of production (128).  In this way, Althusser claims to “[re]think what 
characterizes the essential of the existence and nature of the 
superstructure on the basis of reproduction” (131, italics original). 
Specifically, he equates ideology with practices that, rather than function 




as part of the economic processes of production, contribute to the social 
practices that are necessary for the reproduction of the economy.    
Althusser’s redefinition of ideology raises a second key question: why on 
earth do people act upon the ideological practices? Why, more to the 
point, do they support their own exploitation? Althusser’s answer is that 
the ideological “super-structures” are, as Stuart Hall puts it, “unconscious” 
– not in the traditional Freudian sense of being literally hidden from sight, 
but rather in a weaker structuralist (but also Lacanian) sense, namely 
that, as the taken for granted, common-sense structures of people’s lived 
practices, they are, so to speak, “hidden in plain sight”; overlooked, qua 
escaping attention, not because they are covered over, but rather 
because they are familiar to the point of transparency. As Althusser puts 
it: subjects “live ‘spontaneously’ or ‘naturally’ in ideology’ so that the 
ideology takes on the “‘obviousness’ of the ‘transparency’ of 
language…ideology never says ‘I am ideological’” (160, 161, 165). Stuart 
Hall makes this same point nicely: “Ideology is now understood not as 
what is hidden and concealed, but precisely as what is most open, 
apparent, manifest…It is precisely its ‘spontaneous’ quality, its 
transparency…which makes common sense, at one and the same time, 
‘spontaneous’, ideological and unconscious” (Hall 325).   
 
 Here, then, Althusser radically rethinks the relation of ideology to 
the function of concealment. That is, contrary to traditional Marxist 
analyses, Althusser takes it that ideology functions NOT by putting 
forward credible misrepresentations – “beautiful lies” – which conceal 
from people the facts of their economic exploitation by their rulers. 
Instead, the concealment of ideology is a matter of the ideological 
practices themselves being “objectively invisible” in the sense that, even 
as people act upon them, they escape attention by being taken for 
granted. Thus, for Althusser, it is irrelevant whether people are fooled by 
the ideological lies – ideology sustains its grip either way, by functioning 
as what Gramsci (see below) calls the “implicit theoretical principles” that 
structure what we do. It is in this sense that we may say, with Althusser, 
that ideology is misrecognized at the level of people’s practices, rather 
than merely misrepresented at the level of their ideas. 
 




 Traditionally, Althusser’s rigorous materialist account of ideology, 
which locates anything worth saying about ideology within the realm of 
material practices rather than ideas, is contrasted with Gramsci’s 
account, which, by introducing the relation between what people do and 
what they think, indulges in what Althusser takes to be an unacceptable 
(because idealist) point of view. But the accusation of idealism seems 
hyperbolic. On the contrary, Gramsci agrees with Althusser that, if the 
term “ideology” is understood in the conventional idealist sense of 
mystifying ideas that misrepresent reality then it is not a useful concept. 
Gramsci also agrees with Althusser in distinguishing between this 
conventional “bad” idealist sense of ideology and a materialist sense, 
which grounds ideology in material practices. Gramsci insists, however – 
and here he diverges from Althusser – that, in this materialist sense, 
ideology has positive features that make it essential to the formation of 
social groups. To be specific, he writes: “the name ideology is given both 
to the necessary superstructure of a particular structure and the arbitrary 
elucubrations of particular individuals. The [latter] bad sense of the 
word”, he adds, “has become widespread…[with the result that] every 
ideology is [taken to be] ‘pure’ appearance, useless, stupid, etc.” (Gramsci 
376).  In sum, Gramsci contrasts the conventional “bad” sense of 
ideology, with ideology in a “good” more materialist sense, which plays a 
positive solidaristic role in “structuring historical blocs” and in particular 
“organize[ing] human masses, and creat[ing] the terrain on which men 
move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” (377).   
 
Gramsci elaborates this idea in the context of addressing what he 
calls “the fundamental problem facing any conception of the world, any 
philosophy…that has produced a form of practical activity or will in which 
the philosophy is contained as an implicit theoretical ‘premise’”. He 
immediately adds that, in talking of any such “philosophy”, “one might say 
‘ideology’…but on condition that the word is used in its highest sense”, 
namely as that which fulfills the function of “preserving the ideological 
unity of the entire social bloc which that ideology serves to cement or 
unify” (328, italics mine).4 In this last quotation, like Althusser, Gramsci 
distinguishes a material form of ideology that, in the form of an implicit 
theoretical ‘premise’, is a structuring principle of people’s practices, 




although, in marked contrast to Althusser, he classifies this as a “good” 
sense of ideology “in its highest sense”. 
 
 In sum, whereas Althusser totally dismisses, indeed expunges, any 
reference to ideas from his account of ideology (“Disappeared: the term 
ideas” (Althusser 159)) Gramsci makes a more modest move. To be 
specific, he distinguishes between, on the one hand, a “good”, 
ontologically robust concept of ideology, in which the ideological ideas 
are incorporated as implicit theoretical premises of material practices, 
and, on the other hand, a “bad” purely idealist conception, in which 
ideology merely consists of ideas that cover economic exploitation, 
rather than being materialized at the level of people’s practices.5 Pfaller, 
we will see, makes a similar distinction between “good” and “bad” senses 
of ideology: in particular a “good” ideology involves acting upon what he 
calls “the illusions of others”, whereas a “bad” ideology is based upon 
“faith”.  
 
 But, in addition to the distinction between “good” and “bad” forms 
of ideology, there is a second aspect of Gramsci’s conception of 
ideology, which will be important to our argument here: Gramsci makes 
a second break from the austere materialism of Althusser’s account of 
ideology that excludes ideas from the domain of ideology. In particular, 
Gramsci allows that ideology – even what he calls “ideology in the 
highest sense” – is the site of disavowal. In particular it is the site of a gap 
between “thought and action” – thought that, in Pfaller’s sense, involves 
the “illusions of others” (Gramsci 327). To be specific, Gramsci indicates 
that “a social group that has adopted an [ideological] conception which 
manifests itself in action…[may] for reasons of submission and 
intellectual submission, adopt a conception which is not its own but is 
borrowed from another group, and it affirms this conception verbally and 
believes itself to be following it” (327).  
 
As we will see, both Pfaller and Žižek adopt a similar idea of a gap 
between “thought and action”, although – and this is a key difference – 
they modify, indeed in a sense reverse, the Gramscian scenario. To be 
specific, both Pfaller and Zizek, like Gramsci, allow that subjects may 




borrow the thoughts of others – knowledgeable others – and make those 
thoughts their own by (as Gramsci puts it) “intellectually submitting” to 
them (327). But, by contrast with Gramsci, Žižek and Pfaller insist that 
subjects also borrow the actions of others, albeit naïve others, whose 
actions are based upon what the subjects know to be stupid beliefs –
actions that the subjects enact, even as they keep them at a distance by 
using their own “better knowledge” to disavow the beliefs upon which the 
actions are based. This, in turn, makes for another difference between 
Gramsci and Žižek and Pfaller. Gramsci takes “bad ideology” to be the 
“better knowledge” that people borrow from their “betters”, which has the 
“bad” effect of undermining the effectiveness of the “good” homegrown 
ideology (what Gramsci calls “good sense”) that helps consolidate social 
being. Pfaller and Žižek, by contrast, take the gap between the “better 
knowledge” that people may borrow from their betters and the 
homegrown “common sense” ideology upon which they act to be, 
paradoxically, a condition of the effectiveness of the ideology (rather than 
having the bad effect of undermining it). To put it in a nutshell, Pfaller and 
Žižek take ideology to be sustained by a contradictory relation between 
through and action, whereby the borrowed ideological beliefs, upon 
which people act but do not share, are in contradiction with the “better 
knowledge” that people also borrow from others but which they take as 
their own. This means, Žižek argues (against Gramsci) that people are 
not fools who endorse the idiotic beliefs of others (although, as we will 
see, in Barthes’s terms, they may well be dupes).6 Instead, they know very 
well that they are being exploited in the interests of the ruling class, and 
are perfectly able to “see through” the transparent attempts by the ruling 
class to misrepresent, with a view to concealing, the exploitation.  
 
The question, then, is how this gap between people’s thoughts 
(what they know) and their actions (based upon what they know to be 
idiotic beliefs) is possible? To put it in a nutshell, why do people act upon 
what they know to be an idiotic belief? Žižek answers the question 
beautifully (and here I expand the quotations that I gave earlier): 
 
Althusser speaks only of the process of ideological interpellation 
through which the symbolic machinery of ideology is 




internalized…but we can learn from Pascal that this ‘internalization’, 
by structural necessity, never fully succeeds, that there is always a 
leftover, a stain of traumatic irrationality and senselessness 
sticking to it [what I have called the gap between thought and 
action], and that this leftover, far from hindering the full submission 
of the subject to the ideological command, is the very condition of 
it (Žižek Sublime 43).  
 
 Žižek’s statement here contains a crucial ambiguity: Is the 
“traumatic irrationality and senselessness” that attaches to the 
interpellation a consequence of interpellated subjects not knowing –
being unable to know – precisely what the ISA wants of them? (In 
Lacanian terms we may say that this “not knowing” is a consequence of 
subjects projecting onto the ISA’s desire their own unconscious desires, 
which, because they are unconscious, they cannot know.)  Or is the 
“traumatic irrationality and senselessness” a consequence of a gap 
between, on the one hand, the beliefs upon which subjects are led to act 
in response to the ISA’s interpellative command, and, on the other hand, 
their own “better knowledge”? The latter gap is not so much a matter of a 
difference in truth-value – after all, the belief upon which they act may 
well turn out to be true or at least fit with what the know – but rather upon 
the classic gap between doxa (popular opinion) and episteme (what the 
subject knows), which reflects a difference in rational credibility rather 
than of truth-value. I resolve this ambiguity in the next section.   
 
Žižek v Pfaller 
 
In this section I examine in more detail Žižek’s and Pfaller’s revisions of 
Althusser’s concept of ideology. As I indicated, Žižek and Pfaller both 
follow Althusser in locating ideology in the realm of practices rather than 
ideas, but, unlike Althusser (and more like Gramsci) they focus upon how 
ideology is sustained by the complex relations between ideas and 
practices, and in particular between people’s beliefs, actions, and 
knowledge. To be specific, for Žižek – and here I put his position in 
Pfaller’s terms – a subject’s ideological practices are a matter of him or 
her acting on beliefs, BUT rather than the beliefs in question being beliefs 




that the subject shares, they are the beliefs of others, that is, beliefs not of 
the authoritative big Other (what Althusser calls “the Subject”) but rather 
beliefs of what Pfaller calls “naïve observers”. As such, although the 
subject acts upon the beliefs in question, she or he disavows them 
(Althusser 167; Pfaller Pleasure 234). I indicated, this is a matter not so 
much of knowing the beliefs in question to be false – on the contrary, like 
doxa, they may well turn out to be true – but rather, as Žižek puts it, 
“holding the beliefs at a distance” (Pfaller Pleasure 2-4, Žižek Plague 20, 
and see too Žižek Sublime 33).  
 
 In brief, in Pfaller’s terms, for Žižek, ideological practices are 
practices through which subjects act upon the “beliefs of others” – what 
Pfaller also calls “the illusions of others” – that the subject “knows better” 
than to believe for him – or herself (Pfaller Pleasure 1-3). As such, the 
beliefs in question are NOT subjective beliefs of the subject in the familiar 
idealist sense that the subject consciously affirms them; instead, they are 
“objective” beliefs of the subject in the sense that he or she acts upon 
them despite knowing better than to do so.  
 
 I indicated in the quotation at the end of the last section, that for 
Žižek it is precisely this “traumatic irrationality and senselessness” in the 
form of a gap between the ideological beliefs upon which subjects act 
and their “better knowledge”, that, paradoxically, is the condition of their 
full submission to ideology.  Or as Pfaller puts it, in the case of what he 
calls “the ideology of belief”, it is the gap between belief and knowledge 
that is responsible for the grip exercised by ideological belief upon what 
people do despite, indeed precisely because, they know better than to 
share the belief. Pfaller points out that this phenomenon is not only 
characteristic of ideological beliefs. For example, in the case of the 
superstitious belief that throwing a pinch of salt over one’s shoulder 
neutralizes the bad luck that comes from spilling the salt, it is 
paradoxically the very idiocy of this belief – we all know better than to 
believe it – that is a contributing factor to its enactment becoming an 
object of what Pfaller (following Huizinga) calls “sacred seriousness” to 
the point that acting upon the belief becomes a compulsion (Pfaller 




Pleasure 1-4; 94-106).  How is this possible? How can knowing better 
than to share some belief make it compelling to enact upon?  
 
 Pfaller rejects the traditional explanation that people act upon 
ideological beliefs because they are persuaded of their content. Instead, 
he avails himself of Freud’s theory that despite the fact that, indeed 
precisely because, it enacts beliefs that people know better than to share, 
actions that are substitute for repressed instinctual impulses take on a 
compulsive quality. Pfaller then hypothesizes that any compulsive belief, 
of which ideological beliefs are instances, must be substitute actions in 
exactly this Freudian sense. Then, in a harmlessly circular explanation (in 
which the explanandum functions as evidence for the explanans), Pfaller 
explains the compelling nature of actions that enact ideological beliefs to 
be a consequence of the actions functioning as substitutes in Freud’s 
sense.7  
 
 Thus, rather than defining ideological beliefs in terms of their 
content, he defines them as a category of beliefs that constitute what 
Freud calls “the unwritten laws” that enact compulsive actions (Freud SE 
IX 119). And it is from this alone, rather than from their content, that it 
follows that the beliefs in question are “ambivalent” in the sense that, 
although people act upon them compulsively, they know better than to 
share them. This reverses the conventional approach for explaining the 
grip of ideological beliefs. That is, instead of explaining why the contents 
of ideological beliefs, which people knowing better than to endorse, are 
nevertheless persuasive enough to be acted upon, the Freudian 
approach, which Pfaller uses, explains why a failure to endorse 
ideological beliefs enables, rather than impedes, their compulsive 
enactment.           
 
 In sum, Pfaller begins his Freudian explanation by suggesting that 
everywhere compulsion reigns, it is possible to uncover the presence of 
an unconscious instinctual impulse, for which the compulsive act is a 
substitute, and to which it is symbolically connected (Pfaller Pleasure 
112). The substitute fulfills two conflicting functions: first, as a distortion of 
the unconscious impulse, it both conceals the impulse, and second, it 




provides the impulse with a means of being realized. Pfaller calls the 
conflict between these two functions “an unconscious conflict”, because, 
as he puts it, “one of the adversaries”, namely the realization of that 
impulse, is itself unconscious (101). Pfaller uses the Freudian term 
“ambivalence” to describe the unconscious conflict between positive 
(expressive) and negative (concealing) tendencies within the substitute 
action (100-101).  Pfaller compresses this argument in the following 
succinct statement: “An action becomes compulsive, however, the 
moment when negative tendencies…and positive tendencies conducive 
to it unite because of an unconscious conflict” (103).   
 
 It is important to distinguish the unconscious conflict that Pfaller 
mentions here, which is between the substitute act’s two functions, from 
another conflict that the substitute act generates, namely between the 
suspended illusion that the substitute enacts and the “knowing better” by 
which the subject distances himself from the illusion. As we will see, the 
former conflict plays a key role in explaining the compulsive nature of the 
substitute act, whereas the latter conflict plays a key role in determining 
the quality of the experience of pleasure that the substitute act produces 
in enabling a return of the repressed. Unfortunately, we will see, Pfaller 
does not always distinguish clearly between these two conflicts, a failure 
that has consequences for his explanatory projects. 
 
 Pfaller adds that any “compulsive act [that] resolves a defensive 
conflict by replacing [qua substituting for] an act [that] corresponds to a 
suppressed wish that is to be fended off…can be understood as the 
displacement of the former” (146, italics mine). Pfaller immediately goes 
on to explain: “the concept of displacement…designates a certain method 
of representation by means of signs” (146). In Lacanian terms, the 
relation of displacement between the unconscious instinctual impulse 
(or “wish”) and what replaces it – in Freudian terms, its “substitute” – is a 
matter of a chain of signifiers, or, as Freud would put it, a chain of 
associations, that connect the ideational representative of the 
unconscious instinctual impulse to the conscious representation of its 
substitute. This is the basis of Pfaller’s claim that the substitute is 




symbolically connected to the unconscious instinctual impulse for which 
it substitutes (or we may say, that it “displaces”). 
 
 Here I make my first major intervention into Pfaller’s account. We 
have seen that Pfaller, following Freud, takes the relation between an 
unconscious instinctual impulse and a substitute conscious activity to be 
a matter of a chain of associations that connect them, and therefore a 
symbolic relation. Famously Jakobson takes the associations in question 
to be grounded in pre-existing “objective” relations of contiguity and 
similarity (Laplanche and Pontalis 123), and (surprisingly) Pfaller seems 
to follow Jakobson on this point: “the substitute act attained through 
displacement would have to resemble closely the substitute act” (Pfaller 
Pleasure, 144); and again (this time accompanied by a citation to 
Jakobson): “The relation between an object and its substitute, an act and 
its substitute act, is established on the basis of a frequent or even 
singular past contact” (146, see n 24) .  
 
 I reverse this Jakobsonian account, by taking the associations to 
be set in place by the relation of substitution, rather than vice versa. But 
how then are we to explain the relation of substitution? For Freud, the 
pleasure that comes from a substitute activity is created by a transfer of 
object-libido from the unconscious instinctual impulse to the substitute, 
by a series of displacements of the libido along a chain of associations: 
“an idea’s emphasis, interest or intensity is liable to be detached from it 
and to pass on to other ideas…related to the first by a chain of 
associations…[This involves] cathertic energy able to detach itself from 
ideas and to run along associative pathways…The ‘free’ displacement of 
this energy is one of the cardinal characteristics of the primary process” 
(Laplanche and Pontalis 121). There is a key ambiguity in this statement: 
does the cathecting energy run along pre-existing chains of association 
(as Jakobson suggests), or is the chain formed by the passage of energy 
within the neural network forcing a series of connections between 
ideas?8    
 
 I suggest that the transfer of object-libido from idea to idea forges 
the chain of associations rather than the other way around. But what, 




then, determines the path taken by the transfer of libido? Answer (and 
here I revert to Freud’s early work in the Aufbau) it is the subject’s 
idiosyncratic history of facilitating synaptic connections between 
neurons. Thus, we may say, the psyche functions like an inductive 
machine, for which repeated past facilitations of synaptic connections 
facilitates present (and future) connections.  
 
Explanations, explanations…    
 
What does this theory explain that is of interest to us here? Pfaller claims 
that a substitute act’s ambivalence explains not only the compulsion to 
perform it, but also its “greater amplitude of intensity” or pleasure (Pfaller 
Pleasure 103). Pfaller immediately adds, however, that in many cases this 
enhanced pleasure belongs to the category of what Deleuze calls “sad 
passions”, which, although involving a certain satisfaction, are overlaid 
with unpleasure – or, as Pfaller puts it, is not “perceived as pleasure”. For 
example, to cite a case dear to Pfaller’s heart: subjects who substitute 
watching a TV-show with the activity of taping the show on a VCR “are 
unaware of the fact that they have succeeded in satisfying themselves 
through this game [even to the point that they] continue to complain that 
they are never able to watch their videos” (29).  
 
 First let us examine Pfaller’s explanation for the compulsive quality 
of substitute actions, and, in particular, for explaining “the paradox of 
plays…[in which] players are entirely absorbed in the ‘sacred seriousness’ 
[of the game that they are playing] although at all times they know that it 
is ‘only a game’ [in particular, know better than to believe the stupid 
premise upon which it is based] (103). Pfaller takes his explanation from 
Freud’s theory of ambivalence. Freud observes that an addiction to 
autoerotic pleasures, such as the oral pleasure of sucking the maternal 
breast or its anaclitic substitutes, delays the infant in taking up more 
“mature” forms of getting satisfaction, such as the pursuit of desire. As a 
result, if only as a “natural” step in his or her development, the infant 
initiates a project of keeping in check these “immature” pleasures – for 
example pushing away the (m)Other, or weaning him – or herself from 
the bottle. The child-that-the-infant-becomes retrospectively justifies this 




project by blaming his pursuit of autoerotic oral pleasures upon the 
unbearable, insatiable demand of the (m)Other. “The most anguishing 
thing for the infant is…when the mother is on his back all the while, and 
especially when she’s wiping his backside. This is…the demand that 
never lets up” (Lacan X 53-54). Subsequently, it is through transforming 
this demand of the (m)Other into the (m)Other’s desire, to which the child 
responds with a desire of her own, that the infant attains the status of a 
fully developed desiring (what Lacan calls “separated”) subject.9  In the 
process--at least retrospectively – the infant comes to experience the 
autoerotic pleasures, which she never succeeds in totally leaving behind, 
to be “childish,” “inappropriate,” even disgusting. In short, she distances 
herself from, and, in the technical Freudian sense, represses the 
autoerotic impulses: “When I was child, I spake as a child, I felt as a child, 
I thought as a child; now that I am become a man, I have put away 
childish things (Corinthians 13-11).  
 
 The repression of the autoerotic, through which the infant ensures 
her entrance to full “separated” subjectivity, continues into the infant’s 
later life in the form of opposition to the traces of the autoerotic that 
continue to haunt her. For example, consider the case of repressing the 
autoerotic scopic pleasures of watching TV by a moralistic imperative not 
to “waste” so much time watching TV. Or a different example, which 
belongs to the domain of playing games from which Pfaller draws many 
of his examples: a subject’s autoerotic pleasures in sadistic violence and 
homoerotic contact find an outlet in playing a game of soccer even as 
the violence and sexual bi-play are restricted to what, for the most part, 
are relatively innocuous activities of covertly kicking opposition players in 
the shins and ecstatically “jumping” team members after a goal has been 
scored. By substituting for, qua taking the place of, repressed autoerotic 
impulses, such substitute activities not only contribute to the repression 
of the activity for which they substitute, but also provide a hidden channel 
for the return of the repressed activities along with the pleasures that 
they create. In Freudian terms, they constitute “compromise formations”.  
Another example: the audience for a soccer game delegate their dubious 
but compelling autoerotic pleasures to the players, who (whether or not 
they enjoy it for themselves) commit violence and embrace each other 




on behalf of the audience (if not for themselves), thereby saving the 
audience the trouble (and opprobrium) of doing so themselves. 
 
Unfortunately, when Pfaller comes to explain how substitute 
activities come to take on a compulsive dimension, he confuses the two 
conflicts that I distinguished earlier: first, the unconscious conflict 
between the two functions of the substitute act (namely its function as 
return of the repressed and its contrary defensive function); second, the 
conflict between the suspended illusion that the substitute enacts and 
the better knowledge that suspends the illusion. The confusion between 
these two conflicts is evident in Pfaller’s argument that the “better 
knowledge”, by which we intellectually distance ourselves from the 
beliefs/illusions-of-others that we enact in our substitute activities, does 
not weaken the grip of the activities, but instead paradoxically, “is the 
condition for [the substitute activities’] amplified affective affirmation” 
(104, italics mine).10 Why? Because, he argues, “In a conscious conflict, 
opposing aspirations are subtracted from one another…In an 
unconscious conflict, on the contrary, subtraction never occurs. Instead, 
the powers [the motivations] are simply added together” (102, and see 
too 149). Here Pfaller shifts invalidly between the first and second 
conflicts that I mentioned above, by offering both of them 
indiscriminately as the reason for the compulsive nature of substitute 
acts, and in particular for what he calls their “amplified affective 
affirmation”.  
 
 But close attention reveals that it is only the unconscious conflict 
that explains the compulsive nature of the substitute acts. As Freud puts 
it in his essay “Repression” (1915): “the instinct presentation develops in a 
more unchecked and luxuriant fashion if it is withdrawn by repression 
from conscious influences. It ramifies like a fungus, so to speak, in the 
dark and takes on extreme forms of expression [which] is the result of an 
uninhibited development of it in phantasy and of the damming-up [of 
libido] consequent on lack of real satisfaction” (Freud General 107). So. to 
make my point bluntly, while I accept Pfaller’s argument that the 
compulsive nature of substitute acts is a consequence of their 




ambivalence, I reject his equating the ambivalence with the conflict 
between “better knowledge” and the suspended illusion of others.  
     
Pleasures and their discontents 
 
Now let’s turn to exploring the relation of pleasure to substitute activities, 
in which the latter two conflicts do indeed have a role to play. In so doing, 
I will be making extensive use of what Pfaller calls “interpassive” 
activities. In general terms, Pfaller defines “interpassive activites” as 
substitute activities that involve the delegation of enjoyment. So, for 
example, the TV watcher, who substitutes watching TV shows with 
taping them on a VCR, delegates his pleasures in watching the TV to the 
VCR, which, as Pfaller puts it, “enjoys on his behalf” (Pfaller Pleasure 18, 
22-25; Interpassivity 19). This is not to say that the agency (or as Pfaller 
calls it “the medium of consumption”) to which the pleasurable activity of 
watching the shows is delegated, actually watches – let alone enjoys – 
watching the shows. Even the most avid tapers of TV shows “know 
better” than to share such a foolish belief. Nevertheless, they may well 
act as if they believed it, even to the extent of making pathetic 
justifications, not for the belief itself (which is beyond redemption) but 
rather for their own acting upon it: “By taping my favorite shows I can 
watch them at times that suit me, and so can watch even more of them”. 
By acting upon this belief, which they themselves do not share, they may 
be said to act upon a belief-of-others, which, because the belief in 
question is foolish, is the belief of what Pfaller call “a naïve other”. As 
such, it is not only the pleasure that is delegated to another agency – say 
a machine, like the VCR. It is also the belief that is delegated – not to the 
same agency to which the pleasure is delegated, but rather to a (possibly 
purely fictional) naïve other (Pfaller Pleasure 30; Pfaller Interpassivity 7).  
 
 To forestall a misunderstanding, it is perhaps necessary to point 
out that interpassively delegated enjoyment is not the same as – indeed, 
is a sort of converse of – vicarious enjoyment. That is, in the case of 
vicarious enjoyment, a subject enjoys on behalf of another agent. In the 
case of interpassive activities, by contrast, another agency enjoys on 
behalf of the subject, may indeed impoverish the subject’s enjoyment by 




functioning as the subject’s proxy for enjoyment (on the point see Pfaller 
Interpassivity 34-42). 
 
 But there is more to say about this initial example of interpassivity: 
namely that it involves a double substitution plus a repression. To be 
specific, not only is the activity of taping a TV show on a VCR a substitute 
for the act of watching the show, but also the activity of watching the 
show is itself a substitute for an originary instinctual act of voyeurism 
which is repressed by the double substitution. And like the originary 
instinctual act, the act that substitutes for it (namely the act of watching 
the TV-show) is absent—a past reality, perhaps, but, because it is 
substituted by the VCR-taping, and like the missing premise in an 
enthymematic argument, it takes on the status of fiction, which exists 
only as an element around which the doubled structure of substitution 
takes shape.  
 
 Another example: the use of administrative procedures to punish a 
criminal attack. In the first step, the victim’s originary instinctual impulse 
to undertake a recriminatory act of violence against her attacker is 
substituted by a desire to punish him. But, like the missing premise in an 
enthymematic argument, her personal act of punishment is absent. 
Instead, it is delegated to an interpassive administrative procedure, 
which administers the punishment on her behalf. As such, her act of 
punishment takes on the status of a fiction, which exists only as a 
missing intermediate step within a doubled structure of substitution. And 
at the same time, her active contribution to the punishment is restricted 
to the act of complaint by which she triggers the administrative 
procedures to which she delegates the act of punishment. In short, she 
does not actively punish her attacker. Instead, by delegating the 
punishment to the administration, which punishes him on her behalf, she 
punishes him interpassively. Note: this does not mean that she derives 
no pleasure from the proceedings, but, we will see, the question of her 
pleasure, specifically the question of how she experiences that pleasure, 
depends upon factors that we have not so far discussed.     
 




I have distinguished four components in the overall interpassive 
process: (1) the originary instinctual impulse; (2) the activity that, by 
functioning as a displacement of this instinctual impulse, is a substitute 
for it; (3) the delegated, second-order substitute for this first order 
substitute, and (4) the act of delegation, by which the second order 
substitute takes over for the first order substitute. In what follows, for 
clarity, I will use the term “interpassive act” for the act of delegation (4), 
which lurks in the liminal space that opens up between the first-order 
and second-order substitute activities. Its interpassivity resides in the fact 
that its activity is limited to the one-sided act of delegation, which is 
erased behind the first-order and second-order substitute interactions.     
     
 Armed with examples of interpassivity, I turn now to the more 
general project of explaining the complex relation between pleasure and 
substitute activities. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud relates 
pleasure not to the quantity of “free” unbound libidinal energy, but rather 
to its rate of flow through the channels of the mind: “the factor that 
determines the feeling [of unpleasure and of pleasure] is probably the 
amount of increase or dimunition in the quantity of excitation in a given 
time period” (Freud Beyond 4). In other words, the faster the flow rate of 
libido, the less the pleasure, and vice versa. If we follow Freud in thinking 
of the flow of libido in fluid dynamic terms then we may reframe this 
tentative suggestion as the hypothesis that, rather than it being the 
absolute flow-rate of libido that determines pleasure, it is the evenness of 
the flow. Since increase in flow rate above a certain threshold creates 
turbulence, this hypothesis preserves Freud’s suggestion that a major 
increase in the flow rate of libido will decrease pleasure, but it also 
incorporates Freud’s earlier suggestion (from his essay On Narcissism) 
that it is tensions within the libidinal field that create unpleasure (Freud 
General 66).  
 
 This hypothesis also fits well with Lacan’s suggestion that for 
Freud, the pleasure principle, which governs the workings of the drive 
through which the “mature” (fully separated) subject produces pleasure, 
is a “principle of homeostasis”, according to which it is the evenness of 
libidinal flow that is responsible for pleasure, whereas, conversely, it is 




the turbulence of flow that gives rise to unpleasure (Lacan  XI 31).11 
Specifically, Lacan suggests that the production of pleasure depends 
upon harnessing together counter-directed libidinal currents into a stable 
circular configuration that Lacan calls “the circuit of the drive…a 
movement outwards and back [of libidinal flows that are associated with 
opposing instinctual impulses]” (174, 177). For example, the scopic drive 
depends upon harnessing the libidinal current associated with an 
“active” voyeuristic impulse-to-look together with a libidinal current 
associated with a “passive” counter-directed exhibitionistic impulse to be-
looked-at. Like the counter-directed currents of water in a whirlpool, the 
counter-directed libidinal currents in the drive are harnessed together to 
form a stable, non-turbulent – indeed laminar – circular configuration, 
which is centered upon an empty location within the libidinal field to 
which Lacan gives the name “objet a” or “object of the drive”, of which, 
Lacan says, “la pulsion en fait le tour” (168).  Lacan summarizes this in 
the following terms: “Everything Freud spells out about the partial drives 
shows us…that circular movement of the thrust that emerges through the 
erogenous rim only to return to it as its target after having circled 
something that I call the objet a” (194).   
 
 Pfaller argues that substitute activities also generate a surplus 
“mischievous pleasure”. How does this surplus pleasure come about? 
Pfaller argues that “the illusion of the other…generates (object libidinal) 
pleasure from the self-contempt of its actors” (Pfaller Pleasure 138, italics 
mine). To be specific, rather than taking pride in his or her sensible 
actions, the actor has self-contempt for acting upon what she or he 
knows to be a foolish belief, but at the same time manages to recover a 
measure of pleasure from, as we might say, “playing the fool” or what 
Pfaller refers to earlier as “mischievous pleasure” (32-33).   
 
 At first sight there seems to be an obvious counter example to this 
account. From the beginning of his Presidency (it is reported) Trump was 
in receipt of numerous injunctions by friends and advisors against 
indulging himself in the invocatory pleasures of speaking in public – 
enjoining him not to “speak his mind” directly, but instead to engage in a 
mediated speaking by vocalizing what he reads from the teleprompter. 




Trump’s response has been an interpassively delegated substitute 
activity, tweeting, by which he delegates to the big “T” (Twitter) the 
circulation of tweets as a substitute for his own forbidden activity of direct 
public speaking. Trump is, of course, aware (as we all are) that the 
circulation by Twitter of a tweet, is not the same as him speaking. But 
even so he acts as if he speaks through the tweets. In short, for Trump 
the suspended illusion of the other, upon which he acts but knows better 
than to believe, is that, to all effects, he is speaking through the tweets 
that he sends out for circulation in his name. Of course, it may be 
objected that, because (we are told) Trump composes the tweets himself 
(or has this function been taken over long ago by a Whitehouse aide?) 
“his” tweeting is not really an interpassive susbstitute for his speaking. But 
this objection fails to take into account that the form of the tweet reflects 
the conventions of Twitter more than it does the forms of Trump’s speech 
(although that too is changing, as Trump’s speech takes on the formal 
structures of the medium to which he has come to delegate his public 
communications.)    
 
 Following Pfaller, we conclude that the first installment of pleasure, 
which Trump creates by delegating his public speech to Twitter, reside in 
the pleasures of the return of the repressed activity of speaking. So far so 
good. But what about what I called the “surplus pleasure”? Pfaller, we 
have seen, claims that the surplus pleasure produced by interpassively 
delegated activities come from “self-contempt”. But, it seems fair to 
object, whatever attributes Trump might possess at a psychic level –
arrogance, self-esteem, etc – they do not seem to include much in the 
way of self-contempt, nor we may add contempt for the tweets that he 
produces, let alone for tweeting as such.  
 
 In reply to this objection, it may well be pointed out that Pfaller is 
not using the term “self-contempt” in the usual strong sense of contempt 
that a subject has for himself because of some unfortunate character 
trait. Rather it is a secondary spin-off from the interpassive subject’s 
distancing of the idiotic belief upon which he acts – a special form of 
contempt that the subject has for himself for acting upon a contemptible 
(qua foolish) belief: “The contempt that actors or players feel towards 




their ‘foolish’ games…is simultaneously self-contempt” (138). But this 
secondary form of self-contempt too seems implausible in the case of 
Trump, who, it seems, revel in his tweets, not only for the global interest 
that they garner to his greater glory, but also for the consternation that 
they spread among his “expert” fact-checking critics.12 In short, it seems 
that, in the case of Trump tweets, Pfaller’s explanation for the origins of 
the surplus pleasure of interpassivity fails.13  
 
 How then can we explain the bonus “mischievous pleasure”, 
which Pfaller associates with openly playful belief formations. A Lacanian 
approach provides an answer. To be specific, following Lacan, I suggest 
that the bonus pleasure may be explained by the theory of surplus 
Jouissance, which Lacan develops in Seminar XX, according to which 
the play with signifiers is a source of a surplus “feminine Jouissance” that 
“goes beyond the pleasure principle”. Freud’s emphasis in Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle upon an instinct for repetition – what he calls the 
death instinct – pushes us in the direction of a similar explanation. Rather 
than pursuing this explanation in more detail, however, I turn to what I 
take as the central problem in Pfaller’s account of the relation of pleasure 
to interpassivity.  
 
 There seems to be two sorts of cases in which pleasure is 
experienced through interpassive activities. The first, which, Pfaller 
implies, is in the minority, includes both the lazy academic who 
delegates to a photocopier the hard but pleasurable work of keeping up 
to date with the literature, and the lazy TV watcher, who delegates the 
task of enjoying the programs that he watches to the laugh-track, which 
enjoys the program on his behalf. In this first sort of case, Pfaller claims, 
subjects have direct experience of the “mischievous pleasures”, which 
arise from their successful acts of delegation, as well as the pleasures 
that accrue to the substitute activities because they function as returns of 
the activities for which they substitute. (29, 32-33).  
 
 In the second sort of case, by contrast, which includes the VCR 
taping of TV shows, there is “an impossibility of experiencing them as 
pleasurable”, so that the pleasures that accrue to the substitute activities, 




by virtue of their functioning as disguised returns of the repressed, are 
reduced to what Pfaller (following Deleuze) calls “sad passions”, the 
experience of which is unpleasurable (29,195-198). (Note that although, 
Pfaller assures us, the pleasure produced by the majority of 
interpassively delegated activities is not experienced pleasurably, this is 
not so for other sorts of substitute activities. As Pfaller also points out, in 
the case of perversions and overt gaming activities, pleasures are 
experienced openly rather than transformed into sad passions. The key 
question, then, is what is the difference between these two sorts of cases 
that makes for the different ways in which pleasure is experienced.  
In search of answers let us look at other cases of activities that function 
as substitutes for repressed instinctual impulses – games, for example, or 
the ceremonies of the obsessive. Pfaller argues that such activities enact 
what he calls “suspended illusions” from which the agents of the 
activities distance themselves, even as the activities themselves take on 
the dimensions of a compulsion. It follows that any such substitute 
activity will be structured by a disavowal: namely that its agents do not 
believe in the suspended illusion, but even so, against their “better 
knowledge,” act as if they did. I then distinguish two cases: (1) the 
perverse case, such as the games that people play, in which the agents 
recognize what they are doing, namely acting against their “better 
knowledge”; and (2) the neurotic case, such as the obsessive’s 
ceremonies, in which the actors fail to make this recognition, and thus 
may be said to repress what they are doing. In the perverse case, I claim, 
the pleasure, which is produced by the substitute because it functions as 
a return of the repressed instinctual impulse, is experienced as 
pleasurable; and by contrast, I claim, in the neurotic case the pleasure is 
not experiences as pleasurable.  (Note: it will be important in my 
argument to distinguish two levels of repression in this last example: first, 
a strong repression of the originary instinctual impulse, which the 
substitute activity masks even as it provides it with a distorted means of 
returning; second, a weak repression, which dismisses or at least 
overlooks the extent to which the unwritten laws that structure the 
substitute activity are enacted. Laplanche and Pontalis offer a nice 
discussion of such weaker forms of repression, in which, rather than 




falling outside of consciousness, the repressed is subjected to weaker 
forms of negation (Laplanche and Pontalis 390-394).) 
 
 What theoretical explanations can we can offer for the different 
ways in which the pleasure of a substitute activity is experienced in what 
I have called the neurotic and the perverse cases?  Pfaller offers the 
following explanation: In neurosis “when a certain amount of sexual 
energy [object libido] is drawn from an object [thereby repressing its 
ideational representation] then this same amount of libido can be stored 
in…the ego. [This] object-libido can be transformed into ego-libido” 
(Pfaller Pleasure 204). Pfaller then adds that through this transformation 
of object-libido into ego-libido “the manner in which pleasure is 
experienced is transformed…joy turns into self-esteem” (204).14 On this 
basis, Pfaller concludes that, in neurosis, there is an accumulation of 
ego-libido, and it is this, he claims, that steals our joy. As Pfaller himself 
puts this final step in the explanation: “displacement [of libido] to the side 
of ego-libido…destroys the ability to experience happiness” (205).  
 
I agree up to point with Pfaller’s argument, but with some important 
corrections. For starters I disagree with Pfaller that in what I am calling 
neurotic cases of substitute activities “a certain amount of sexual energy 
[object libido] is drawn from an object”. On the contrary, I claim, in 
neurotic cases of substitute activity exactly the reverse phenomenon 
takes place: instead of a drawing back of ego-libido from the substitute 
activities, there is a draw-backing of object-libido. Why? Because in so 
far as substitute activities are “repressed” in the weak sense of being 
dismissed/overlooked, it is their ego-libidinal charge that is drawn back, 
since it is through their ego-libidinal charge that they enter 
consciousness. The result of this drawing back of ego-libido from the 
substitute activity is that the liberated ego-libido retreats to the ego, and 
ergo, there is a hypercathexis of the ego, which (and here, for a moment, 
I agree with Pfaller) results in a joyless self-esteem that swamps the 
pleasure, which the subject gains from the returns of the repressed. But, 
and here too I disagree with Pfaller, the reason for this joylessness is not 
because (as Pfaller implies) there is something intrinsically joyless about 
self-esteem: “self-esteem…finds it difficult to feel its happiness” (205).  Nor 




is it because (as Pfaller also says) ego-libido has a special “aptitude for 
accumulation” or because “displacement to the side of ego-
libido…destroys the ability to experience happiness” (205). Rather it is 
because, as Freud indicates, the hypercathexis of the ego, like any 
excess accumulation of libido (whether object-libido or ego-libido) is the 
cause of unpleasure.15  And conversely, of course, in cases of perverse 
substitute activities, no such repression takes place, and as such the 
experience of pleasure is uncompromised.  
 
 In short, Pfaller is correct that it is the excess accumulation of ego-
libido and the consequent outpouring of self-esteem that causes 
pleasure to be experienced unpleasurably, but he is wrong to blame this 
upon the inherently joyless nature of self-esteem or upon the fact that 
transformation of object-libido into accumulation of ego-libido makes “joy 
turn into self-esteem” (204). Instead, the villain that robs us of our joy (or 
at least of the experience of it) is the damming up of libido (whether 
object-libido or ego-libido).       
 
 This explanation provides an answer the question of why in some 
cases (the perverse cases) but not in other cases (the neurotic cases) 
are subjects aware of the extent to which they enact the foolish beliefs 
that structures their substitute actions? Answer: whether a substitute 
activity falls into the neurotic or perverse category depends upon the 
extent to which the agent of the activity recognizes what Žižek calls “the 
symbolic power of the mask”, that is, recognizes that, despite his “better 
knowledge”, he acts upon the suspended illusion. To be specific, if he 
does recognize this then we approach the perverse form of substitute 
activity, such as we find in games that we take seriously despite 
recognizing the stupidity of their conventions; and, I have argued, it is in 
exactly this sort of case that the pleasure of the activity is experienced 
pleasurably. Conversely, if the recognition fails, then we approach the 
neurotic form of substitute activity, such as we find in the obsessive’s 
ceremonies, and consequently lose access to our pleasures. 
 
 The question then arises: what determines whether a substitute 
activity by an agent falls under the category of the neurotic or the 




perverse.  From our theory of substitute actions, it follows that the 
determining factors are precisely not the technological means of 
producing the substitutes, but rather the agent’s highly idiosyncratic 
history of neuronal facilitations. For example, depending upon an agent’s 
history of making associations, her photocopying may end up as 
neurotic rather than playfully perverse. We may generalize this 
conclusion by pointing out that, for any technological prosthetic device 
that confers an interpassive dimension upon the substitute activities that 
it enables, whether the substitute activities are experienced pleasurably 
depends upon their user’s idiosyncratic histories rather than the 
technology. It follows that Pfaller’s treatment of interpassivity must be 
purged of the technological determinism that divides interpassive 
technologies into those which, like photocopying and canned laughter, 
are fun use, and those which are not.  
 
 
From Religion to Ideology 
 
Finally, I return to the topic of ideology. Based upon his theory of 
interpassive substitute actions Pfaller distinguishes two forms of 
ideology: (1) an ideology-of-faith, and (2) an ideology-of-belief. For my 
purposes, I narrow the definitions of “faith” and “belief” that Pfaller takes 
from Mannoni (Pfaller chapter 2). In particular, I take “faith” to be 
unconditional personal convictions – “illusions of their own” – upon which 
subjects are committed to acting. As such, faith operates with a 
commitment to closing the gap between what subjects take themselves 
to know and what they take themselves to be doing; (2) I take “belief”, to 
be what Pfaller calls “a suspended illusion” upon which subjects act 
despite it not being an “illusion of their own”. As such, although they act 
upon it, they know better than to believe it for themselves. Thus, by 
contrast with faith, belief operates by opening rather than closing the gap 
between what people know and what they do. In short, belief is “an 
illusion of others kept at a distance through better knowledge” (Pfaller 
Pleasure 121).  
 




 Pfaller argues that, because of its ambivalence belief has “proved 
to be compulsory for its actors – more so than faith is for the faithful”. He 
then goes on to make the historical claim that belief “appeared as a 
universal early form of ideology” which, because of the compulsion to act 
upon it, was even better placed to play a solidaristic role than an 
ideology based upon faith, which, Pfaller claims, only “appeared as a 
later form [of ideology] typical only of certain cultures [including our 
own]” (121). Pfaller offers this history of ideology not as an accurate 
account of the past. Rather, it is what Foucault calls “a history of the 
present” –  a story about the past which has the conceptual function of 
providing a stage upon which a current conceptual division is exhibited 
to advantage. 
 
 In the light of this history, Pfaller raises the key question of “what 
causes the transition from belief to faith-like forms of ideology. The 
transition occurs, he claims, “as a result of a tension internal to belief 
[specifically its ambivalence, which means that] we can…speak of a 
‘dialectic of belief’”, and, he adds, “correspondingly with this 
dialectic…belief would gradually evolve into the self-esteem of faith” (122).  
In support of this claim, Pfaller offers his version of Freud’s account of the 
evolution of religion, that we find in his essay “Obsessive Actions and 
Religious Practices”. Following Freud, Pfaller claims that, historically, 
religion began as enactments of belief, which the religious acted upon 
despite “knowing better”. Pfaller argues that it is precisely this 
ambivalence between the practices of the “faithful” and their “better 
knowledge” that explains the practices’ compulsory quality. Pfaller then 
adds that, because the beliefs that were enacted by the practices were 
foolish, the practices themselves offered a weak, easily undermined 
defense against the repressed instinctual practices for which they 
substituted, especially “as new temptations surface[d]”. As a result, Pfaller 
says, citing Freud, “The defensive conflict must be constantly renewed – 
not only because new temptations surface…but also because the 
achieved [defensive] solutions increasingly prove to be unfit forms of 
defence” (Freud SE IX, 127).  Consequently, the religious rituals undergo 
a process of what Pfaller calls “miniaturization”, so that, as Freud puts it, 
“the petty ceremonials…gradually become the essential thing and push 




aside [even further] the underlying thoughts [repressed instinctual 
impulses]…[and] tend to become increasingly ‘foolish’ and ‘senseless’ in 
appearance” (128). As a result, we reach the situation in which the high 
Church of England finds itself today: personal conviction of God’s 
existence, indeed any theological knowledge at all, has become 
irrelevant – reduced to “counting the number of angels on the head of a 
pin” – but ritual practices have multiplied, swollen in importance, despite 
their increasing distance from any justification: “all smells and bells”, as 
we say.   
 
 This diffusion of ever more formal rituals, and correspondingly their 
increasing distance from any “better knowledge” that might justify them, 
ends up undermining the system. Pfaller asserts that it at this point of 
reductio ad absurdum that “a switch” takes place, away from the 
increasing ritualization of the religious belief system towards what Freud 
calls a process of “reform”, which he describes “aim[ing] at re-
establishment of the original balance of values” (126, Pfaller Pleasure 
128).  At this point Pfaller intervenes into Freud’s narrative. He insists that, 
rather than the restoration of an “original balance of values”, the process 
of reform that Freud has in mind here is a switch to a system of faith in 
which the once-upon-a-time-believer-now-man-of faith is committed to 
closing the gap between knowledge and action/belief in the direction of 
knowledge rather than ritual; a switch that Pfaller exemplifies by that 
other English church, Hume and his anti-ritualistic “invisible religion” in 
which no ritual practices are permitted that are not justified by good 
sense (132).  
 
 I suggest contra Pfaller that, when Freud says that the religious 
reform “aim[s] at re-establishment of the original balance of values”, we 
take him at his word. In particular, I argue contra Pfaller, that the reform 
that Freud has in mind cannot be a religion-of-faith, since, as both Pfaller 
and Freud indicate, faith is a later form of religious practice rather than an 
“original”. Instead, I suggest, the reform that Freud has in mind when he 
talks of returning to an “original balance of values” is a return to a pre-
miniaturized form of belief in which the gap between belief and 
knowledge is not so wide that rituals are irrelevant (Hume’s “invisible 




religion”) nor reduced to purely formal gesturings so divorced from 
knowledge that their “foolishness” has become magnified to the point of 
absurdity (the high Church of England). In short, for Freud, the switch is 
not forward to faith but instead backwards to an earlier form of belief, in 
which some sort of “balance” existed between theology and ritual—not a 
“balance” in the sense of a synthesis, of course, but rather a balance in 
which ambivalence, qua a tension between belief/ritual and knowledge, 
is restored to the point that the ritual enactments of belief take on a 
compulsive quality despite (indeed precisely because of) being in 
tension with “better knowledge”. Of course, this reformed religion is open 
to the same self-destructive dialectic of belief that brought it to the point 
of reform in the first place, but, I argue, it is precisely in the succession of 
dissolutions and installation of such reforms (with of course changes in 
content permitted) that resides religion’s hope of ever-lasting.        
                            
 This Freudian history of religion illustrates that the gap, which is 
constitutive of belief – namely the gap between the twin poles of, on the 
one side, ritual and, on the other side, “better knowledge” – can be closed 
in two ways: (1) it can be closed around the pole of ritual, which ends up 
with a degraded form of belief in which a purified, “stand alone” system 
of rituals transcends the harsh judgement of “better knowledge” (the 
heavily ritualized high Church of England), or (2) it can be closed around 
the pole of better knowledge (Hume’s “invisible religion”).16 I suggest that 
in so far as both of these developments – namely the degradation of 
belief into pure ritual that Freud takes as the trigger for reform, as well as 
Pfaller’s version of Freud’s “reform” religion, namely the shift towards an 
anti-ritualistic rational religion –involve the dissolution of ambivalence, 
they are, in Pfaller’s sense, shifts away from belief into faith, but 
undertaken in opposite directions: They mark, on the one hand, a shift 
towards faith in ritualistic forms (knowledge as connaissance), and, on 
the other hand, a shift toward faith in “better knowledge” of a 
propositional kind (savoir). And contra Pfaller, neither of these switches 
constitutes what Freud himself presents as the moment of “reform”, 
namely a regressive shift back to full belief, which “work[s] retroactively” 
for “a re-establishment of the original balance of values” (Freud SE IX 
126).        





 This brief excursus into Freud’s history of religion and Pfaller’s 
expurgation of it raises the question of whether, as Freud hints but Pfaller 
denies, there is space in religious life for a happy ending, in which 
happiness is not only present but also experienced as happiness. In 
terms of the argument that I have been running here, this question 
comes down to whether religion can be sustained as what I called a 
perverse substitute activity, in which ambivalence between ritual and 
better knowledge is preserved along with an element of play? Pfaller 
says no. Even in the case of playing games, he contends, faith will 
eventually triumph over belief. To be specific, Pfaller contends that even 
when we treat a game with “sacred seriousness” – even as we enjoy 
playing it – we will grow tired of devoting ourselves to its “foolishness”. 
Against this pessimistic diagnosis, I suggest, that what Freud calls 
“reform” heralds the possibility of breaking the hold of faith and 
reestablishing belief – not permanently, of course, since inevitably belief 
will degrade again into one of the forms of faith (either high church 
smells-and-bells or Hume’s rational religion), but at least for long enough 
to provide a temporary respite from the joyless horrors of faith. And, by 
being open to renewal, this respite offers not only an alternative to 
endless faith, but also, by incorporating an element of play, a path to true 
happiness.  
 
 For the reader concerned with the rosy theological implications of 
the last conclusion, let me hasten to assure you that my point in dwelling 
upon the history of religion is political rather than theological: namely that 
religion provides a template for investigating the question of whether our 
fate includes the possibility of using ideology constructively (Gramsci) or 
whether instead we are destined to be being used by it (Althusser). 
Following Pfaller, I divide ideologies into two main categories – 
ideologies-of-belief and ideologies-of-faith. I take ideology-of-belief to be 
characterized by a double ambivalence: First a strong ambivalence due 
to what Pfaller calls an “unconscious conflict” between a repressed 
instinctual impulse and the defenses against its return. This strong form 
of ambivalence, which is common to both ideology-of-belief and an 
ideology-of-faith, is (Pfaller argues) responsible for the compulsive nature 




of the ideological substitute practices, and ultimately, in a collectivized 
form, lays down the conditions for an ideologically induced solidarity. 
Second, a weak form of ambivalence, characteristic of ideology-of-belief 
but not of ideology-of-faith, which takes the form of a gap between, on 
the one hand, the suspended “illusion-without-owners” that an 
ideologically interpellated subject enacts in his or her practices, and, on 
the other hand, the “better knowledge” by which the subject suspends 
the illusion. I have argued that it is the perverse recognition (rather than 
neurotic repression) of this weak ambivalence that enables the 
pleasurable experience of pleasure.  
 
 The question, then, is whether it is possible to sustain a happily 
perverse ideology-of-belief, or whether (as in Pfaller’s account of religion) 
it is inevitable that we end up mired in either an uhappily neurotic 
ideology-of-belief or (perhaps an even worse fate) an ideology-of-faith in 
which self-esteem displaces pleasure. In the context of examining this 
question, Pfaller notes that in our society today, “we do not acknowledge 
the illusions without owners” (Pfaller Pleasure 282). In claiming this, he 
does not mean that we, in our culture, deny the existence of illusions 
without owners, but rather that we “dismiss” them. By this he means not 
only that we intellectually distance ourselves from them by using our 
“better knowledge” to “see through” them, but also that, in so far as we 
organize our activities in accord with such illusions (as we continue to 
do, despite intellectually distancing them) we do not acknowledge, 
indeed repress, that we are doing so.  
 
 Freud alerts us to this fact of everyday life: “For instance, to take the 
case of the bed ceremonial: the chair must stand in a particular place 
beside the bed; the clothes must lie upon it, folded in a particular order; 
the blanket must be tucked in at the bottom and the sheet smoothed out; 
the pillows must be arranged in such and such a manner, and the 
subject’s own body must lie in a precisely defined position. Only after all 
this may he go to sleep” A propos of Pfaller’s last point, we add that it is 
not only the compulsive adherence to such rituals that is the issue, but 
also that as subjects today, we conceal from ourselves—neurotically 
repress--how dependent we are upon such rituals and the beliefs-of-




others that they enact (even as we distance ourselves from them)  (Freud 
SE IX, 119).  (In Lacan’s terms, in so far as we do this – distance ourselves 
from the beliefs, which we refuse to recognize that we enact in our daily 
rituals – we are the “non-dupes who err”).   
 
 The political point of this is that, for better or worse, in so far as 
such beliefs-of-others and the rituals in which they are embodied, take 
on a collective dimension they take on a solidaristic role of holding 
together the social fabric—and in that sense, we may say, take on an 
“ideological” dimension in the conventional sense of the term. But at the 
same time, Pfaller argues, in so far as we refuse to recognize our 
dependence upon them, we lose touch with the pleasures that they 
nevertheless offer. Worse than that, in so far as we repress that 
dependence, they take on a neurotic quality—a primary source of what 
Freud calls the “discontents of civilization”.  
 
 To make matters even worse, Pfaller points out, we willingly enact 
another sort of ideology into which, Pfaller argues, the ideology-of-belief 
tends to degenerate: namely an ideology-of-faith (Pfaller Pleasure 265-
268). This either consists of what Freud calls “unwritten laws” that are 
realized in pure (high Church) rituals, which, by transcending the 
criticism that “better knowledge” throws at them, discredit--or at least 
make irrelevant – our “better knowledge” (SE IX, 118). Or it consists of 
personal convictions – “illusions with owners” – which, having owned up 
to having them subjects use to justify the practices in which the illusions 
are realized (Hume’s “invisible religion”). In both cases, Pfaller argues, the 
weak ambivalence that characterizes belief is lost, and as a result 
contact with the pleasures that the practices produce is lost too. In short, 
the concerns raised by an ideology of faith are that, as Pfaller makes the 
point, the shift to an ideology of faith creates a “massive loss of pleasure” 
(282).  
 
 The upshot – and here I agree with Pfaller – is that if we are to 
avoid not only this loss of pleasure but also the mad (neurotic) 
discontents of civilization, and at the same time achieve the solidarity 
that is necessary to the formation of the social then there is only one form 




of ideology that will do the job: namely the perverse form of ideology-of-
belief. Thus – and here I agree with Pfaller – the political project for today 
is to work towards a society that is organized not by a joyless ideology of 
faith in which narcisstic self-esteem replaces pleasure, but rather by an 
ideology of belief in its non-neurotic perverse form, which manages to 
preserve what Huizinga points out that we, in our society today, have lost: 
namely the “ludic element of culture” (282).  
 
 My main point here is that discarding Pfaller’s rather gloomy 
prospect for religious belief (namely its inevitable decay into faith) in 
favor of Freud’s more optimistic gesture toward religious “reform,” may 
provide a means of thinking in new ways about the possibilities of 
realizing Pfaller’s political project. To be specific, by exploring an analogy 
between what Freud says about the reform of religious practice (namely 
as the renewal of belief rather than, as Pfaller claims, a degeneration into 
faith) it may well be that we can gain some new insight into the 
possibilities for a positive change in the ideological forms of society 
today. Although, at the same time, it is important to bear in mind that, 
because of Freud’s taken for granted assumption of an analogy between 
obsessive ceremonies and religious practices, it may well be that, by 
using his theory of religious reform as a model for political change, we 
skew things in the familiar direction of a civilization bedeviled by neurotic 
discontents.      
 
1 Another well-known weakness in Althusser’s account, which I do not have the space to 
discuss: in so far as he gives an account of how individuals acquire subjectivity, it 
seems that the individuals in question cannot be subjects already, but, in apparently 
direct contradiction of this he says that “individuals are always-already subjects” 
(Althusser 164). Žižek and Pfaller both offer ways out of this difficulty.     
2 This Žižekian formulation has the provocative consequence of rendering redundant a 
whole tradition in political activism, namely the sixties politics of consciousness-
raising—a consequence that, no doubt, goes some of the way to explaining the hostility 
with which Žižek’s ideas have been greeted. Althusser, of course, would reject this 
Zizekian formulation, not because of a hankering for consciousness-raising—on the 
contrary, he would agree totally with the political bankruptcy of consciousness-raising--
but rather because, unlike Žižek, his theoretical concerns are purely with what people 
                                                        




                                                                                                                                                              
do, independently of what they may or may not believe or know. I return to this point 
below. 
3 This raises the key question of how, from an Althusserian perspective, to reconstruct 
Marx’s famous distinction between the “base” and “superstructure”--a distinction that 
Marx drew in terms of the difference between a material “base” of economic practices 
and an immaterial “superstructure” of ideological ideas. 
4 Note the ambiguity in the phrase “ideological unity”: is the unity itself ideological in the 
sense that it is an ideological construct, or is the unity independently constituted and 
the ideology merely a means of consolidating it? 
5 Gramsci is a little less doctrinaire in his materialism than Althusser, in so far as, when it 
comes to defining ideology, he does not dismiss the realm of ideas tout court, but 
instead focuses upon ideas as the “necessary structuring principles” of practices. 
6 In his inaugural Collège de France lecture (1977), in what amounts to a pun on the title 
of Lacan’s Seminar XXI (1973-4), “les non-dupes errent”, Barthes tells us that les dupes 
non-errent. In saying this he means that the fools (the ones who err) are not the dupes 
who enact the ideological lies even while “seeing through” them. Rather, the fools are 
the “non-dupes”, who, because they “see through” the lies, think that they are somehow 
innoculated against their effects. In short, the dupes have the advantage of playing with 
the lies. They see though the lies but even so, and in full knowledge of what they are 
doing, act upon them; whereas the non-dupes err in thinking that, by seeing through the 
lies, they are immune to their effects, unaware that they continue to act upon them 
(Friedlander 125).         
7 Michael Scriven argues that, although this sort of epistemological circularity renders an 
explanation useless as a potential predictor, it is a harmless characteristic of many 
explanations (Scriven).  
8 Jakobson implies that the chain of associations between ideas being determined by 
preexisting relations of similarity and contiguity between the items signified by the ideas 
(or, for that matter, by preexisting material relations between the signifiers of the ideas, 
as in the relations between signifiers created by punning (Pfaller 146) 
9 The subject’s desire, as Lacan reminds us, is the desire of the (m)Other (Lacan XI 
Chapter 16). 
10 Pfaller notes a similar paradox in the behavior of obsessives: namely that obsessives’ 
commitment—indeed compulsion—to acting out their rituals is quite consistent with, 
indeed, Freud suggests, seems to be a consequence of, their admitting that they have 
no adequate reason for performing them: “I know that I take my tidying up activities too 
far but I don’t seem able to stop myself; indeed, paradoxically, the very stupidity of my 
activities seems to be an impediment to my stopping them” (Pfaller Pleasure 27-29). 
11 In confirmation of this hypothesis we may note that, despite the release of tension that 
it creates, the process of catharsis, which involves a rapid release of tension, will be 
unpleasurable, because the rapid change in the rate of flow of libido in a carthatic 
release of libido creates turbulence in the libidinal flow, although the end-point of the 
cartharsis may, of course, be pleasurable, because the flow will have been reduced to 
“normal” speed at which it is no longer turbulent. 




                                                                                                                                                              
12 One could try to rescue Pfaller’s argument by claiming that Trump’s arrogance is 
merely a cover for a wounded ego, covertly bleeding from self-contempt, but this seems 
to be an ad hoc shift with little going for it other than saving Pfaller’s argument. 
13 Specifically, it seems that the origins of Trump’s pleasure from tweeting is an 
exhibitionistic pleasure arising from the attention that his tweets garner, and, doubling 
this, a pleasure at showing up the alleged experts--the self-proclaimed “fact-checkers”-- 
for failing to understand that what he says are not lies but instead ironic exaggerations. 
An interesting complication: Trump surely knows better than to believe the global-
warming sceptics, whose opinions he nevertheless broadcasts and even enacts. 
Following Freud, then, we may speculate, that broadcasting these beliefs is a sort of 
distorted return of the repressed pleasures of the passive arm of the invocatory drive: 
namely hearing rather than speaking. We may take the object of this invocatory drive to 
be the Voice of the Other (what Lacan calls the soundings of the Shofar (Lacan X 245)) 
with which Trump attempts to align his own utterances even as he attempts to hear it in 
the shitty remarks of his experts that he rebroadcasts.   
14 Here Pfaller calls upon two Freudian ideas: Freud’s early idea that the “strangulation” 
or “damming up” of libido is experienced as unpleasurable, as well as the concept of 
secondary narcissism in which the fixing of object-libido onto the ego-object transforms 
object-libido into ego-libido (or at least into libido that is indistinguishable from ego-
libido) (Laplanche and Pontalis 13, 94; Freud General 64). 
15 Freud’s explicitly indicates that the excessive accumulation – or as he calls it 
“damming up”-- of libido in either form--either ego-libido or object-libido –  results in 
unpleasure. For example, he writes: “the mechanism of disease…in the transference 
neuroses…is to be connected with the damming -up of the object-libido (Freud General 
66, italics mine); and of course, the neurotic “unhappy” form of being-in-love involves a 
“marked sexual overestimation” of the beloved, which in turn implies a damming up of 
object-libido upon the “love object” at the expense of an “impoverishment of the ego in 
respect of libido” (69). 
16 The Humean alternative is the anti-ritualistic, rational religion of my youth, in which, by 
dismissing the implausible remarks in the Bible as either anachronistic or as no more 
than colorful metaphors, scientifically and rhetorically trained priests trimmed down the 
Bible in order to make it fit with the latest scientific theory. Thanks to well-meaning 
friends, my later brushes with religion veered more to the high Church side. 
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